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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHELE McIVER BELL, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
v s . ] 
HAROLD FREEMAN BELL, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. ] 
» BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
) Case No. 900183-CA 
Trial Court No. 89148 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The final divorce decree from which this appeal is taken was 
signed by the court on March 8, 1990. The Notice of Appeal was 
filed on April 3, 1990. 
This court has jurisdiction over the appeal in this matter 
by virtue of the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 1 et 
seq., Section 78-2A-1, et seq. Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), 
and Rule 3 R. Utah Ct. App. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final divorce decree signed and 
entered by Judge F.L. Gunnell of the First Judicial District 
Court of Cache County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court committed error, given the 
length of the marriage, the earning of a Master's degree by 
respondent during their marriage with appellant1 help, the 
disparate financial circumstances and earning ability of the 
parties, needs of the parties and relative standards of living of 
the parties, in awarding appellant only $6,000 in alimony( 
1 
calculated at 250 per month for a period of two years) payable 
by awarding appellant the personal property in her possession 
which the court valued at $6,000. 
2. Whether the trial court committed error in the valuation 
and distribution of the personal property of the parties, because 
the trial court failed to fully account for the personal property 
acquired during the marriage, and failed to make a proper finding 
as to its value. 
3. Whether the trial court committed error in not awarding 
appellant all of her attorney fees and cost presented at the 
trial court, respondent clearly having the greater income and 
income earning capacity. 
4. Whether appellant is also entitled to an award of 
attorney fees and cost on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Both parties were awarded a divorce on November 15, 1989. 
A final divorce decree was entered on March 8, 1990. An appeal 
of the alimony, property division and attorney fees and cost 
award was filed on April 3, 1990. 
DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
Trial was held on November 15, 1989. After the finding of 
jurisdiction, the presentation of evidence, and the hearing of 
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testimony from both parties, the trial court granted both parties 
a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. 
The court awarded custody of the parties minor child to the 
appellant, Michele Mclver Bell (hereinafter mother), subject to 
reasonable visitation rights awarded to the respondent, Harold 
Freeman Bell (hereinafter father). The father was also ordered 
to maintain current accident, health, and life insurance on the 
child, and awarded any savings bonds currently being maintained 
for the child. 
The court ordered the father to continue to pay the mother 
$450.00 in child support, an amount previously agreed upon by the 
parties, which court noted was higher than the child support 
guidelines. The father is allowed to claim said child as a 
dependent on his income tax which is contrary to the child 
support guidlines. 
The court awarded the parties real property to the father, 
after finding that the said real property really has no equity. 
The trial court awarded the mother $6,000.00 in alimony, 
payable at $250.00 per month for two years. In making the order, 
the court stated that it found this divorce to be unusual in that 
the parties pursued separate careers and has had a history of 
marital problems. The court found the parties standard of living 
was "artificially established" and not helpful in its guidance. 
Also, the court found that due to depleted assets and significant 
debts, their individual earning capacities was their only asset. 
In arriving at the above stated alimony figure, the court found 
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the mother's needs to be a "great deal", and the father's ability 
to provide "essentially nothing". The court explained that the 
two year period was to provide the mother with a period of time 
to adjust to the fact that she will be solely dependant on her 
income thereafter. However, in lieu of the awarded alimony, the 
court awarded Ms. Bell all personal property in her possession as 
described by Mr. Bell's exhibit number 14, with the exception to 
three items in Mr. Bell's possession. The court, in making such 
an arrangement did not determine the value of all of the parties 
personal property, and acknowledged that there was some question 
as to the value of the property. However, the court stated that 
the values assigned by the parties were not challenged, and 
there were no other alternatives. The effect was to distribute 
the parties personal property according to possession. 
Finding that the parties have essentially established 
separate identities, financially and otherwise, and the parties 
individual debts to be roughly equal, the court ordered each 
party to assume all debts and obligations in their own name. 
The mother was awarded half of the father's retirement in 
the military acquired during the marriag to be divided when 
withdrawn, subject to a deduction of $3,800.00 which represents 
the father's share of the mother's retirement fund that she 
liquidated just prior to the divorce proceeding to support 
herself. 
Finding the father to have a limited ability to generate 
money, but acknowledging that the court has not required him to 
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pay many of out-of-pocket expenses in the decree, the court 
ordered him to pay $800.00 of the mother's attorney fees and 
cost. 
The court found the mother's salary to be $1,500 per month, 
based upon her past earnings as a teacher which she has had to 
forego for approximately two years while she pursued her Master's 
degree at Utah State Unversity where she received $863.00 per 
month as a teaching assistant. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. The parties were married on June 5, 1979 in Logan, Utah. 
The mother filed for divorce on March 3, 1989. A decree 
granting the parties a divorce was entered on March 8, 1990. 
2. During the course of the marriage, one child was born on 
August 28, 1990 to the parties, to wit. Stephanie Bell. Now six 
years of age. 
3. The father is currently a Major in the Air Force, 
stationed at Holloman Air Force Base located in New Mexico, 
(Transcript, page 4, lines 12-15) with a current monthly salary 
of $3,660.00, or approximately $40,000.00 yearly. (Transcript, 
page 14, lines 11-16.) 
4. The mother was completeing a Masters degree at Utah 
State University in education, (Transcript, page 9, lines 11-13; 
and page 11, lines 24-25.) receiving $863.00 per month as a 
teaching assistant. (Transcript, page 9, lines 14-16) 
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5. During the course of the parties approximately eleven 
year marriage, Mr. Bell earned a Masters Degree, (Transcript, 
page 13, lines 5-6.), which assisted him in the advancement of 
his military career. (Transcript, page 165, lines 15-19.) The 
earning of the degree was a result of a joint effort from both 
parties. While Mr. Bell continued to work and provide for the 
family financially, Ms. Bell assisted Mr. Bell with his school 
work. (Transcript, page 13, line 5-13, and page 165, lines 9-
14.) The parties agreed the mother would assist the father with 
his course work, and when the mother decided to return for her 
graduate degree, the father would help her. (Transcript, page 
13, lines 5-13.) 
6. The mother began that effort to earn her Master's degree 
while the parties were married, but she did not receive any 
support from the father. (Transcript, page 14, lines 1-6.) 
7. The mother wants to continue her education and earn her 
Ph.D., which would allow her more flexibility in a work schedule 
and increase her potential salary, both of which would be 
beneficial to the child of the parties. (Transcript, page 12, 
lines 9-16.) 
8. The parties were seperated several times during their 
marriage because of the fathers abusive action, and due to 
military assignments oversees. (Transcript, page 40, lines 5-8.) 
9. The mother started classes at Utah State approximately 
in the fall of 1988. (Transcript, page 41, lines 8-11.) 
6 
11. While Mr. Bell was stationed in Koreafrom 1987 to 1988 
he gave the mother between $1,600.00 to $1,800.00 per month. 
(Transcript, page 166, lines 16-18.) After the father returned 
from Korea, he refused to provide Ms. Bell with any further 
financial support because she had decided on attending Utah State 
without any discussion with him,(Transcript, page 154, line 23.). 
By agreement he did pay her $450.00 per month in child support 
for their daughter. 
12. Prior to Ms. Bell coming to Utah State Unversity, she 
taught school in North Carolina for seven years where she had 
accumulated $7,600.00 in a retirement fund. In February, 1990, 
she needed money for living expenses and was forced to liquidate 
her retirement fund. (Transcript, page 32, lines 12-17.) 
$4,000.00 of the fund she used for living expenses incurred prior 
to arriving in Logan to attend Utah State. The balance was used 
for living expenses she incurred while in Logan, Utah, because 
she was receiving no support from Mr. Bell. (Transcript, page 
33, lines 9-18. ) 
13. While in Korea Mr. Bell purchased a dining room suite. 
When he returned to New Mexico he purchased a stereo, 
refrigerator, washer and dryer, (Transcript, page 158, lines 5-
9.), which he did not list as marital property. (Transcript, page 
169, lines 18-22.) Mr. Bell was also awarded a 1986 truck 
purchased during the marriage. (Transcript, page 182, lines 24-
25. ) 
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14. The personal property in Ms. Bells' possession is 
largely furniture approximately years old, being purchased when 
the parties were married. (Transcript, page, 23, lines 19-21.) 
A list of the furniture is shown on Ms. Bell's exhibit 10. Ms. 
Bell also has two automobiles one of which is no longer 
operating, and was purchased for $500.00 when she arrived in 
Logan, Utah. (Transcript, page 16, line 5-14. ) Her other 
vehicle, the 1982 Datsun, is located in North Carolina, being 
untrustworthy to drive across the country in. (Transcript, page 
22, lines 19-23.) 
15. Mr. Bell agreed that Ms. Bell's attorney fees and cost 
are reasonable, and that the case was "unduly" complicated, but 
refused to assume her fees and cost asserting that, essentially, 
the divorce is her fault. (Transcript, page 132, lines 3-19.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. As a result of the courts failure to adequately and 
fairly consider the financial circumstances of the parties, and 
the contribution of each party to the marriage, the court abused 
its discretion by awarding Ms. Bell only $6,000 in alimony. Such 
abuse of discretion was compounded by the fact that in lieu of 
cash payments of $250 per month for a two year period, which 
equals $6,000, Ms. Bell was awarded the personal property in her 
possession, which the court found to be valued at $6,000. 
2. Due to the trial courts failure to make a full 
account and valuation of the marital property involved in this 
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case, the courts ordered distribution of the ma 
inequitable and constitutes an abuse of its discretion. 
3. The courts award of only $800.00 in attorney fees and 
cost constitutes an abuse of its discretion in that all the 
evidence presented sufficiently demonstrated that fees and cost 
were reasonable, Ms. Bells' need, and that Mr. Bell was able to 
provide for that need. 
4. Because the final decree was grossly inequitable, Ms. 
Bell was forced to appeal the decree to defend her interest. 
Such actions constitute reasonable and good faith grounds upon 
which the appeal is pursued, and since Mr. Bell is able to 
provide and Ms. Bell is not, she should be awarded fees and cost 
on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
BECAUSE OF THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
BOTH PARTIES, WITH MR. BELL CLEARLY 
HAVING THE GREATER EARNING ABILITY, 
MS. BELL SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED 
MORE THAN $6,000 IN ALIMONY. 
In 1985, the Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), following precedent set forth 
in the case of English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977), 
firmly established and thoroughly analyzed the three factors that 
must be considered in determining whether an alimony award is 
fair and reasonable. The three factors are: 1) the financial 
conditions and needs of the wife; 2) the ability of the wife to 
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produce a sufficient income for herself; and 3) the ability of 
the husband to provide support. 
In applying these three factors to this case it become clear 
that the trial court failed the adequately consider the facts of 
this case in light of the three factors. Moreover, the record 
makes apparent that as to Mr. Bells1 ability to pay, the trial 
courts abuse of discretion is obvious. 
Ms. Bells present financial circumstance is depressed and 
even after the completion of her schooling will not be anywhere 
comparable in earnings to what she could have had had she not 
sacraficed to help Mr. Bell during their eleven year marriage 
her needs are great. Nevertheless the court awarded her only 
$6,000 in alimony. Ms. Bell is a single parent and a graduate 
student at Utah State University. Her budget, plaintiff's 
exhibit 9, reflects that her monthly expense is approximately 
$2,493.00. To put this figure in context, it is proper to reduce 
the figure by $450.00, the amount of child support awarded, as 
the figure contemplates the expenses for the parties child. This 
would leave Ms. Bell with a monthly expense of $2043.00. 
Ms. Bell's income amounts to only $863.00 a month from her 
job as a graduate teaching assistant. The figures balanced, 
leave Ms. Bell with a monthly debt of $1180 per month. This 
order substantially reduces the standard of living Ms. Bell and 
the child once enjoyed during the course of the eleven year 
marriage. 
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Further compelling is that some of the debts which appear on 
Ms. Bell's monthly budget are debts that she incurred in the 
remaining year and a half of the marriage in order to maintain 
herself while completing her Masters degree. This is so, because 
during the last year and half the the father refused to provide 
the her with any support except $450.00 per month which the 
father made clear was solely intended as child support. 
Considering the second factor. The trial court found that 
Ms. Bell's salary to be $1,500 per month. Such a figure is a 
historical salary based on what she made as a high school teacher 
in North Carolina. While this may reflect her earning ability, 
it is improper and unfair to use the historical figure based on 
the circumstance of the marriage and Ms. Bells' current 
particular situation. 
In Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988), the 
appellant, inter alia, appealed an alimony award. During the 
course of the parties marriage, the defendant husband secured a 
medical degree. The court found that the degree enabled him to 
earn approximately $100,000 per year. Prior to the earning of 
the medical degree, the parties endured a poor standard of 
living. This court found that relatively small alimony award 
could be justified based on the Ms. Bells' previous standard of 
living, however, "But such a result is unfair.- A divorce court 
is a court of equity. It is not equitable to preserve the status 
of limited income for one party and affluence for the other when 
the one sacrificed to help the other achieve such affluence." 
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Id. at 74. While Martinez is factually distinguishable from this 
case, the inequity of using appellants historical earnings to 
mitigate the alimony award is analogous to the rational used in 
Martinez. 
During the parties ten year marriage Mr. Bell earned a 
Masters degree. While he did so at night and on the weekends so 
that he could continue to work full time, such luxury was only 
possible due to Ms. Bells' enormous contribution of taking care 
of the household, their child, and assisting Mr. Bell in his 
course work. In other words, the efforts that went into earning 
Mr. Bell's Masters degree was a joint effort from both parties. 
Undoubtedly, as a result of Mr. Bell's Masters degree his earning 
ability has increased as well as his ability to move up in rank 
in the military. 
Now Ms. Bell is completing her Masters degree, and desires 
to continue to earn a doctorate degree so that both her and the 
child's future will be promising. While she is completing her 
Masters degree she did not receive the same support from Mr. 
Bell. Without any financial support from her husband and no time 
to maintain employment, Ms. Bell incurred debts and even had to 
withdraw her retirement from her past employment in order to meet 
living expenses. 
Now the parties are divorced. Mr. Bell and the trial court 
deem it fair that Ms. Bell should only receive $6,000 in alimony 
based, among other things, on her past earning ability. While 
such an equation may work in most cases, here, because Ms. Bells' 
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current needs are significantly comprised of debts she incurred 
while in graduate school, during which time Mr. Bell provided no 
financial support, to use her earning ability to mitigate the 
alimony award overlooks Ms. Bells' contribution to Mr. Bell's 
Masters degree and his neglect in failing to providing any 
financial support while she was earning her Masters degree. 
Certainly, $6,000 would not cover the expenses Ms. Bell incurred 
for the year and a half Mr. Bell neglected to provide her with 
financial support. In other words, it "preserve[s] the status of 
limited income for one party and affluence for the other..." Id. 
at 74. Thus, since Ms. Bell "sacrificed to help" Mr. Bell 
achieve his personal and career growth, he in turn should at 
least be required to support her in achieving hers. Ms. Bell 
deserves at least an amount equal to the costs she incurred in 
gaining her degree, which surely would be greater than the $6,000 
awarded. 
As to the third factor, the ability of Mr. Bell to 
provide support, the court's error and abuse could not be 
clearer. The trial record reflects that Mr. Bell indicated that 
his current salary is $3,660 per month or roughly $40,000 per 
year. As far as monthly expenses, Mr. Bell purports to have a 
monthly expense of $5,090. The accuracy of this figure is 
suspect. In regards to a balance Mr. Bell owes on a debt to the 
Air Force for a salary advance, he listed a balance of $2,000 in 
his exhibit. However, in questioning, his response was 
$1,200.(Transcript page 160, lines 11-17.) He qualified the 
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conflict in figures by stating that deductions have been coming 
out directly every mQnth from his salary. This leads one to 
believe that perhaps the $5,090 is quite inflated. Nevertheless, 
when itemized, the figure seems unreasonable. 
In any event, the trial court concluded that Mr. Bell could 
pay "essentially nothing". (Transcript page 182, lines 8-9.) In 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that the trial court should have taken into account the 
"legitimate and reasonable needs" as they relate to the defendant 
and his ability to pay. Although in Jones the cost pertained to 
respondent's business expenses as they related to his ability to 
pay, here the situation is no different. Mr. Bell's expenses 
relate to his personal cost as they relate to his ability to pay. 
The fact that the court concluded that Mr. Bell could pay 
"essentially nothing" from a $40,000 per year salary undoubtedly 
makes questionable whether the trial court made a "reasonable and 
legitimate" assessment of his cost, and consequently, his ability 
to pay alimony. 
Considered collectively, these factors can only lead to the 
belief that the trial court, through oversight or mistake, abused 
its discretion and awarded an alimony amount far below a 
reasonable and justified figure. 
More disturbing, is that in lieu of a cash award, the court 
awarded Ms. Bell all the personal property in her possession 
thereby negating the alimony award altogether. 
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The trial court distributed the personal property of the 
marriage according to who had possession. The court valued the 
personal property in Ms. Bell's possession at $6,000.00, but did 
not value the property in Mr. Bell's possession. The court then 
used the personal property awarded, half of which belonged to Ms. 
Bell as full satisfaction of the alimony payments. 
By doing so, the trial court used in the personal property 
distribution twice, which consequently, had the effect of not 
awarding any alimony at all. 
Therefore, not only did the trial court improperly evaluate 
the three factors articulated in English and Jones to arrive at 
an inequitable alimony award, but moreover, by using Ms. Bell's 
share of the personal property to satisfy the alimony award, such 
arrangement had the effect of denying Ms. Bell any of the alimony 
award that the court just awarded. 
II. 
BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO ACCURATELY 
ACCOUNT FOR AND VALUE THE INVOLVED MARITAL PROPERTY, 
AND FAILED TO CONSIDER MS. BELL'S EXHIBITS 
IN THE ASSESSMENT OF THE VALUES OF THE 
SAID PROPERTY, THE COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN THE VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION 
OF THE PROPERTY OF THE MARRIAGE. 
In Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987), this court 
stated that in some cases, failure to include property valuations 
constitute an abuse of discretion sufficient to require remand 
for determination of values. This was an agreement with the 
rational articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). However, in both cases the 
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courts refused to remand the determination of the property values 
because in each case it was appellant's counsel that failed to 
include valuation figures for the property, a condition precedent 
to appellate review regarding the equity of the distribution. 
Here, Ms. Bell's counsel submitted property valuations as 
evidence of the value of the property in Ms. Bells' possession as 
well as values, to the best of Ms. Bells' knowledge, of that 
property in Mr. Bells' possession. Nonetheless, the court stated 
that it had only one exhibit regarding property valuations, Mr. 
Bell's. See Transcript, page 183, lines 8-10. Therefore, the 
court forgot Ms. Bell's exhibit and determined the value of her 
property solely from Mr. Bell's exhibit. Moreover, the court 
failed to scrutinize the accounting of the marital property and 
determine a value for the personal property awarded Mr. Bell. 
The collective effect of the courts actions was an 
inaccurately value the personal property in possession of the 
parties. Accordingly, without an accurate accounting, and 
valuation of all the marital property, the distribution thereof 
was inequitable. 
Mr. Bell maintained, however, that the property he acquired 
in New Mexico and Korea was not marital property. This is 
incorrect, and contrary to statute and established law. Fletcher 
v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 ( Utah 1980). According to Fletcher, 
property acquired during the course of the marriage is considered 
marital property subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. 
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In total, not only did the trial court fail to make a 
finding as to the value of the property in Mr. Bell's possession; 
but moreover, ignored the testimonial evidence presented at 
trial, and failed to make a full account of all of the marital 
property acquired by the parties during the marriage. Property 
that was in Mr. Bells' possession that he did not list but should 
have. The conclusion can only be that the property distribution 
was inequitable, and an abuse of discretion by the trial court 
afforded it pursuant to 30 U.C.A. 30-3-5 (1984). Accordingly, 
such clear abuse of discretion calls for a remand for a full 
accounting and determination of the value of the property. Boyle, 
735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987) 
III. 
BECAUSE ALL THE REQUIRED EVIDENCE WAS 
PRESENTED, AND THAT EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
WAS REASONABLE, AND BECAUSE MS. BELL 
HAS ESTABLISHED HER NEED, THE AWARDED 
ATTORNEYS FEES IS CLEARLY INADEQUATE. 
In Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980), Utah Supreme 
Court provided a thorough discussion of the principles that a 
trial court should concern itself with in determining the award 
of attorney fees. The award must rest "on a basis of evidence of 
need and reasonableness" Id. at 1384. In elaborating on the 
*"reasonableness" of the fees, the court articulated several 
particular factors: number of hours dedicated, reasonableness of 
the hourly rate in light of the difficulty of the case, results 
accomplished, and the comparative rate charged. While the court 
did not go so far as to make these figures a condition precedent 
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for review of the award, the court did note that the hourly rate 
should not be examined independently, but in the context of the 
facts and emotion of the case. As applied to this case, these 
factors too clearly show that, an award of $800.00 for attorney 
fees and cost for total bill of $2,350.00 in fees and $91.50 in 
cost was inadequate. 
Ms. Bell has adequately demonstrated her need. Her monthly 
budget demonstrates a need of $2,043, excluding child expenses 
which is covered by child support. Even with her earning ability 
of $1500.00 per month runs a monthly debt of $500.00. Based on 
this it can only be said that her need is great, or in the words 
of the trial court, a "great deal". Nevertheless, while noting 
that "I am not really ordering the defendant to make a lot of 
out-of-pocket payment in this particular case", the trial court 
ordered Mr. Bell to pay only $800.00 in fees and cost from a 
$40,000.00 year salary. Moreover, because Ms. Bell was not 
awarded any cash alimony award, rather in lieu of cash, was 
awarded the personal property in her possession, the balance of 
her fees only makes her financial position more compromising. 
As to the reasonableness of the fees and cost, the 
inadequacy is no less compelling. This divorce was not "usual". 
At the time of the divorce the parties lived in separate states. 
Mr. Bell filed a motion to stay proceedings becauseof the 
Soldier's and Sailor's Relief Act, which was contested. Much of 
their personal property was spread throughout various locations. 
The parties, for at least the two years prior to the action, 
18 
created numerous loans by several lenders. The collective effect 
of all this made the Discovery, organization, and strategy of the 
case difficult and complex. Indeed, the services rendered ran 
"the gamut of the complexities of the human condition." Id. at 
1385. 
In light of the above, the fees totaled $2,350.00. This was 
based on an hourly rate of $100.00 out of court, and $110.00 in 
court, of which 16.0 hours and 6.0 hours were expended 
respectively. A signed affidavit describing the above figures 
including a break down of the specific action taken, by date 
rendered, was submitted to support the charged fees. The 
reasonableness of the fees is evident. It is not uncommon, as 
the above cited case demonstrates, for fees in divorce actions to 
reach upwards of $10,000 or more. Concededly, the above cited 
case was more involved, but proportionately, the fees charged in 
this case would likely fall well below if the cases were 
factually similar. 
Based upon the circumstances of the parties at the time of 
the divorce, and the difficulties that such circumstances created 
in the litigation of the case as they substantiate the 
reasonableness in the fees and cost charged, and the financial 
situation of both parties with Ms. Bell showing a true need and 
Mr. Bell showing an ability to contribute, Ms. Bell as a matter 
of equity, should be entitled to a remand for a more equitable 
determination of the awarded fees and costs. 
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IV. 
BECAUSE OF MS. BELL'S DEMONSTRATED NEED, 
MR. BELL'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE, AND THE 
REASONABLE AND GOOD FAITH GROUNDS UPON 
WHICH THIS APPEAL IS BASED, MS. BELL SHOULD 
BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES AND COST ON APPEAL. 
Not unlike the principles which guide a trial court in the 
award of attorney fees and cost at the trial level, an award of 
attorney fees and cost on appeal should also consider the 
appealing partys1 needs and the opposing partys' ability to pay. 
In addition, however, because of the implicit potential abuse of 
the appellate procedure, especially in divorce proceedings, 
appellate courts have also required that in order to prevail in 
such a request, there must be a showing of good faith and 
reasonableness upon which the appeal is pursued. Re Marriage of 
Davis, 141 Cal.App.3d 71 (1st. Dist. 1983). 
The Utah Supreme Court has generally espoused the same 
principles. Where a party was required to defend an appeal, 
later to be found without merit, the defending party, upon a 
reasonable and proper showing, was afforded a remand to the trial 
court for the determination of attorney fees and cost on appeal. 
See, Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104 (1977); and Carter v. 
Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978). 
Although in the above cited cases, the requesting party was 
the defendant, the principles of equity are no different in this 
case simply because the requesting party is the appellant. Here, 
Ms. Bell, in a sense, is defending her interest to a divorce 
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decree which she asserts and has argued above to be unfair. 
Thus, she is a appellant by procedure, but a defendant by nature. 
The reasonableness and good faith grounds upon which this 
appeal is based has been fully discussed above. Briefly, Ms. 
Bell has demonstrated that she is clearly the disadvantaged party 
financially. The court finding her needs to be a "great deal", 
awarded her $6,000.00 in alimony. However, in lieu of cash 
payments, she was awarded all the personal marital property in 
her possession, which she should have been entitled to anyway as 
her fair share of the said marital property. The effect was to 
negate the awarded alimony altogether. Additionally, the trial 
court distributed the personal marital property without first 
making a full account and valuation of said property thereby 
resulting in an inequitable distribution. It is upon these 
reasonable and valid grounds, that Ms. Bell now appeals. 
As to Ms. Bells' needs, and Mr. Bells' ability to pay, the 
current circumstances of the parties provide an adequate 
illustration. Ms. Bell is a graduate student with an earning 
ability of $1,500.00 per month. She is a single parent, with a 
significant amount of debt which was largely due to her student 
status. She has relatively few assets. Mr. Bell, on the other 
hand, has an established military career as an Officer with a 
current yearly salary of $40,000. Such disparity demonstrates 
the needs and ability of each party respectively. 
In both Ehninger and Carter, due to the fact that the 
requesting party was forced to defend the appeal, which in the 
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later was found to be without merit, and in the former was 
affirmed in the later, said party was entitled to have such 
request remanded to the trial court for a reasonable and proper 
amount of fees and cost on appeal. Here, Ms. Bell was "forced" 
to institute this action. Negotiations to settle failed, leaving 
only the appellate process as a viable means of protecting her 
interest from an improper and inequitable divorce decree. A 
fortiori, Ms. Bell should be entitled to the same remedy as the 
requesting parties were in the above cited cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the aforementioned reasons, Ms, Bell respectfully 
request this court to remand the final divorce decree entered in 
this case to the trial court for a review of the alimony award, 
property distribution and awarded attorney fees and cost 
contained within said decree. 
Ms. Bell further request that she be awarded attorney fees 
and cost on appeal. 
Dated this 21st day of June, 1990. 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
LYLElW. HILLYARD (J ^ 
(Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF was mailed, postpaid, to 
Defendant/Respondent Freeman Harold Bell, at 1509 Pinon Drive 
Alamorgordo, New Mexico 88310, this 21st day of June, 1990. 
Lyle/W. Hillyard L/ 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHELE McIVER BELL, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. I 
FREEMAN HAROLD BELL, ] 
Defendant. ] 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
• Civil No. 890000148 
This matter came on for hearing on the 15th day of 
November, 1989, before the Honorable. F. L. Gunnell, District 
Court Judge. Personally appeared the Plaintiff and her 
attorney, Lyle W. Hillyard, and the Defendant and his 
attorney, Tim W. Healy. The parties were sworn and testified 
and evidence was presented. The Court having heard the 
testimony and reviewed the evidence, and being fully advised 
in the premises, makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff is now and has been for more than 
three months immediately preceding the filing of this action, 
a resident of the County of Cache, State of Utah. 
2. That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married to 
each other on the 5th day of June, 1979, in Logan, State of 
Utah, and ever since that time have been and now are husband 
and wife* 
A - 1 
3. That one child has been born as issue of this 
marriage, namely: STEFANIE BELL, born August 28, 1983, and no 
more children are expected. 
4. That Plaintiff is the fit and proper person to be 
awarded the care, custody, and control of the said minor child 
subject to reasonable visitation rights of the Defendant to 
CM 
3 include 30 continuous days each summer, with the Plaintiff to 
5 decide by May 1st of each year, in consultation with 
Defendant, when those 30 days will begin and Defendant to pay 
jE all costs of transportation. The parties were advised that if 
O 
jf Stefanie becomes really homesick and staying further with 
(0 
£ Defendant will be seriously disruptive, she should be sent 
< 
« back to Plaintiff and the parties should work with each other 
§ maturely and allow telephone calls and contacts. Further, 
(0 
-J 
o 
« Defendant is allowed to telephone the child at 10:00 a.m. at 
z 
o £ the child's residence Saturday or Sunday and to speak for up 
u 
Q 
< to 20 minutes. The child should call Defendant and is 
Q 
f. encouraged to call whenever the child wants to. Defendant is J 
(0 
u 
to give Plaintiff 48 hours notice if he is in the area and 
t wants to visit with the child. That neither party is to 
o 
< discuss the other negatively before the child. 
5. That during the course of the marriage, 
irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parties 
making it impossible to continue the marriage and each party 
should be granted a divorce, one from the other. 
-2-
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6. That this marriage had deteriorated and there is no 
possibility of reconciliation; therefore, the statutory 
waiting periods before this divorce is made final should be 
waived. 
7. That for the purposes of child support, Plaintiff's 
income is set at $1,500.00 a month and Defendant's is set at 
5 $3,660.00 a month, and child support should be $450.00 a 
i 
H month, which Defendant is currently paying and is in excess 
z 
§ of the Uniform Child Support Schedule with this support abated 
o 
-J 
one-half for the 30 days visitation each summer. 
8. That a Withhold and Deliver Order in favor the 
Plaintiff should be prepared and issued by the Clerk of this 
" Court, who is authorized to deliver it immediately to 
z 
111 
(0 
-I 
o 
Defendant's employer pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-45b-5, upon the filing of Plaintiff's Affidavit that the 
z 
j£ Defendant is over 30 days delinquent in his monthly obligation 
hi 
Q 
< to pay child support. 
ri 
x 
£ 9. That Plaintiff should be allowed to claim the child 
-j 
* as a dependent for income tax purposes, but the parties may 
t calculate the net advantage of allowing Defendant to claim the 
o 
< child and if there is a net savings and they qualify under IRS 
rules, then Defendant may claim the child and reimburse the 
Plaintiff for the income tax she has to pay because of the 
loss of the child as a dependent and split the net savings 
between the parties. 
-3-
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10. That Defendant should be awarded the real property 
the parties have acquired at 3908 Foster Drive in 
Fayetteville, North Carolina, subject to his assuming all the 
debts, and Plaintiff shall sign any necessary papers and 
Defendant shall hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
11. That regarding alimony, because the standard of 
? living is based on debt and wasted assets and not established 
z 
£ by the lifestyle and in lieu of any alimony, Plaintiff is 
z 
g awarded all the personal property now in her possession 
o 
-J 
x which the Court places a value of $6,000.00 based on the 
O 
z 
I-
(0 
<D 
I-
< 
UJ 
husband's Exhibit No. 14. 
12. That each party should be ordered to assume the 
debts in their own name. 
on the Woodward formula, subject to a reduction of $3,800.00 
£ 13. That regarding retirement, Plaintiff should be 
0) 
_J 
<, awarded an interest in Defendantf s military retirement based 
z 
o 
0) 
ir 
u 
Q 
< when that retirement is paid as being Defendant's one-half of 
6 
x 
J Plaintiff's retirement that she cashed in in February of 1989. 
-j 
-J 
1
 14. That Defendant should maintain all insurance at its 
<0 
LU 
U 
£ current level for the child's benefit so long as there is a 
o 
< child support obligation; provided, however, that in the event 
Defendant has additional natural children, they may be 
included as co-beneficiaries on the existing life insurance 
and death benefit plans. In the event that Defendant acquires 
additional life insurance or death benefit plans in the future 
-4-
A - 4 
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(A 
(T 
kl 
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Z 
< 
Q 
tr 
< 
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j 
J 
u 
u 
Uu 
k. 
O 
< 
and names after-born children as beneficiaries, he shall also 
include Stefanie as a co-beneficiary. 
15. That Defendant should pay Plaintiff $800.00 on her 
attorney fees plus costs. 
16. That the 15 savings bonds that Defendant has 
acquired to date should be maintained for the child. 
17. That the Defendant should maintain health and 
accident insurance on the minor child as long as there is a 
child support obligation and that all uninsured medical bills 
will be paid 50 percent by each party, except the custodial 
parent will pay the routine office calls. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
That an order should be entered in accordance with the 
foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED this ^ day of ^iLA/lAtLL , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
fa 10 j \ v L v ^ i / 
IF. U. GUNNELL 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
Attorney for Defer* 
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HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
175 EAST FIRST NORTH 
L O G A N , U T A H 84321 
TELEPHONE(801) 752-2610 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHELE McIVER 
VS. 
FREEMAN HAROLD 
BELL, 
Plaintiff, ] 
BELL, ] 
Defendant. 
DECREE AND ORDER 
) FOR DIVORCE 
1 Civil No. 890000148 
This matter came on for hearing on the 15th day of 
November, 1989, before the Honorable F. L. Gunnell, District 
Court Judge. Personally appeared the Plaintiff and her 
attorney, Lyle W. Hillyard, and the Defendant and his 
attorney, Tim W. Healy. The parties were sworn and testified 
and evidence was presented. The Court having heard the 
testimony and reviewed the evidence, and being fully advised 
in the premises, and having heretofore made its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, enters the following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That Plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce from 
the Defendant and the Defendant is awarded a decree of divorce 
from the Plaintiff to become final upon signing. 
2. That Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody, and 
control of the minor child of the parties, to-wit: STEFANIE 
BELL, born August 28, 1983, subject to reasonable visitation 
A-6 
rights of the Defendant to include 30 continuous days each 
summer with the Plaintiff to decide by May 1st of each year, 
in consultation with Defendant, when those 30 days will begin 
and Defendant to pay all costs of transportation. The 
parties were advised that if Stefanie becomes really homesick 
and staying further with Defendant will be seriously 
5 disruptive, she should be sent back to Plaintiff and the 
5 parties should work with each other maturely and allow 
z 
5 telephone calls and contacts. Further, Defendant is allowed 
jE to telephone the child at 10:00 a.m. at the child's residence 
O 
* Saturday or Sunday and to speak for up to 20 minutes. The 
(A 
X 
£ child should call Defendant and is encouraged to call whenever 
< 
« the child wants to. Defendant is to give Plaintiff 48 hours 
u notice if he is in the area and wants to visit with the child. 
0) 
-I 
o 
« That neither party is to discuss the other negatively before 
the child. 
CM 
z 
z
o 
(0 
tr 
U Q 
< 3. That Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff as and 
ri 
<r 
> for child support, the sum of $450.00 a month, which support 
shall be abated one-half for the 30 days visitation each 
to •* 
tu 
o 
t summer. 
o 
< 4. That a Withhold and Deliver Order in favor the 
Plaintiff shall be prepared and issued by the Clerk of this 
Court, who is authorized to deliver it immediately to 
Defendant's employer pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-45b-5, upon the filing of Plaintiff's Affidavit that the 
-2-
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Defendant is over 30 days delinquent in his monthly obligation 
to pay child support. 
5. That Plaintiff is allowed to claim the child as a 
dependent for income tax purposes, but the parties may 
calculate the net advantage of allowing Defendant to claim the 
child and if there is a net savings and they qualify under IRS 
j rules, then Defendant may claim the child and reimburse the 
i 
fc; Plaintiff for the income tax she has to pay because of the 
2 
o loss of the child as a dependent and split the net savings 
-j 
jE between the parties. 
o 
fc 6. That Defendant is awarded the real property the 
parties have acquired at 3908 Foster Drive in Fayetteville, 
North Carolina, subject to his assuming all the debts, and 
Plaintiff shall sign any necessary papers and Defendant shall 
hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
7. That in lieu of any alimony, Plaintiff is awarded all 
o 
2 
o 
u> 
X 
Id 
Q 
< the personal property now in her possession. 
ri 
> 8. That each party is ordered to assume the debts in 
their own name. 
V) 
Id 
U 
t 9. That Plaintiff is awarded an interest in Defendant's 
o 
< military retirement based on the Woodward formula, subject to 
a reduction of $3,800.00 when that retirement is paid as being 
Defendant's one-half of Plaintiff's retirement that she cashed 
in in February of 1989. 
-3-
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10. That Defendant is ordered to maintain all insurance 
at its current level for Stephanie's benefit so long as there 
is a child support obligation; provided, however, that in the 
event Defendant has additional natural children, Defendant 
may include them as co-beneficiaries on the existing life 
insurance or death benefit plans. In the event that 
5 Defendant acquires additional life insurance or death benefit 
CO 
I 
H plans in the future and names after-born children as 
g beneficiaries, Defendant is ordered to also include Stefanie 
i as a co-beneficiary. 
<r 
o 
* 11. That Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff $800.00 
on her attorney fees plus costs. 
12. That Defendant is ordered to maintain for the said 
g minor child the 15 savings bonds that Defendant has acquired 
(0 
-I 
° to date. 
z 
8 13. That the Defendant is ordered to maintain health and 
c 
kl 
Q 
< accident insurance on the minor child as long as there is a 
d 
J child support obligation, and that Plaintiff and Defendant are 
J j 
1
 ordered to pay 50 percent of all uninsured medical bills, 
w 
c except the custodial parent will pay the routine office calls, 
o < DATED this % day of ^7l/\nAi\L , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: , 
') 
APPROVED AS TO FO; 
'. /L. GUtfNELL 
District Court Judge 
Tim -tfr-'Healy 
Attorney for Defendajy6 
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